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Abstract 
Why does Japan have a large earnings gap between regular and non-regular employment? 
We attempt to answer this question through the lens of the legitimation of inequality, assuming 
the possibility that the inequality remains unresolved because it is legitimized due to 
institutional settings in Japanese society. In this paper, we explore to what extent the inequality 
is legitimized, as well as how it is legitimized, in Japanese society by analyzing data collected 
from a comparative vignette survey on the just income of fictitious workers in comparison with 
South Korea and the United States. The results of multilevel model analysis show that the 
income gap between regular and non-regular employees is accepted as just in Japan and 
South Korea. Moreover, non-regular worker respondents think that the income gap should be 
wider than regular worker respondents do (against their own interests) only in Japan. To some 
extent, the acceptance of income inequality and its over-acceptance by non-regular workers 
can be explained by the assumed difference in the duties and opportunities in the workplace 
between regular and non-regular employees, which is brought about by the male breadwinner 
model and Japanese firms’ practices to secure the livelihood of employees and their families. 
Based on the results, we argue that the income inequality between regular and non-regular 
employment in Japan has a stronger logic of legitimation and, therefore, is more likely to 
persist than in other countries.
Keywords
Non-regular employment, Just income, Fairness, Factorial vignette survey, Employment 
systems
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1. Introduction
Japan has witnessed the exacerbation of socioeconomic inequality over the last few 
decades, despite a long-held belief that Japan was a relatively egalitarian society. Particularly, 
the earnings inequality between regular workers and non-regular workers, such as part-time, 
contract, and dispatched workers, is quite large compared to that of other counties1 (OECD, 
2017; Takahashi, 2018). 
As we will see later, Japanese non-regular employment is characterized not only by 
precariousness in terms of employment stability but also as work meant for supplementary 
earners of households, which is brought about by the male breadwinner model and Japanese 
firms’ practice of providing “family-supportive rewards” to the head of household. Under this 
practice on the basis of need,2 there has emerged a distinction between regular employees 
who can enjoy generous rewards to support their families and stable employment in exchange 
for their full commitment to firms and non-regular employees who are exempted from certain 
duties and responsibilities, such as overtime work and relocation, in exchange for accepting 
low wages (Imai, 2011). As the distinction is highly correlated to separate gender roles in 
Japanese society, regular employees are mainly male, while non-regular employees are 
mainly female, particularly those who are married.
There is a possibility that the above feature attached to the distinction between regular 
and non-regular employment in Japan is a factor of the reproduction of the large income gap 
between the two types of employment. Rewards inequalities can persist only when they are 
properly legitimized in modern societies, which emphasize the value of equality (Costa-Lopes 
et al., 2013). Based on this perspective, the income gap between regular and non-regular 
employment can remain unresolved because it is legitimated by the assumed difference in 
job conditions, such as duties and responsibilities, to a greater extent in Japan than in other 
countries. This may be one reason for the large income gap and its reproduction according to 
the type of employment in Japan.
This vicious circle can be explained by the framework of reward expectation theory, 
which assumes that shared beliefs about the specific status of individuals influence justice 
evaluation (Auspurg et al., 2017). According to the reward expectation theory, nominal 
characteristics that are not related to one’s ability or competence become associated with 
reward expectations based on certain shared beliefs through social interaction. If it occurs, 
even those who are in a disadvantageous position share the beliefs and thereby accept the 
inequality. Since social interaction is constrained by institutions, we can expect that different 
institutions nurture different shared beliefs about the specific status of workers. The Japanese 
employment system might attach different shared beliefs regarding abilities or duties and 
responsibilities to regular and non-regular workers, which legitimate and reproduce the income 
gap.
1. All other factors being equal, the average income of full-time regular to full-time non-regular workers 
is 92.7% in the U.S., while it is as low as 79.0% in Japan, according to our analysis of PIAAC data.
2. This practice of Japanese firms, however, is gradually weakening according to the globalization of 
management systems.
5
FFJ D
ISC
U
SSIO
N
 PA
PER
 #19-02
In this paper, we examine whether such legitimation is evident by utilizing data on the 
just income of fictitious workers from a factorial survey that we conducted in Japan, South 
Korea, and the United States. First, we explore the extent of the gap in just income between 
regular and non-regular workers, as well as the gap according to gender and other attributes 
of workers. Next, we analyze whether even the disadvantaged, such as respondents who 
are non-regular workers, accept the gap in just income and what explains the extent to which 
people accept inequality in income. In doing so, we attempt to reveal how employment systems 
shape and reproduce income inequality in Japan from a comparative perspective. 
2. Employment systems and non-regular 
employees from a comparative perspective
2.1. Non-regular employees under the Japanese employment 
system
In Japan, firms, particularly large businesses, have supported employees’ families 
by providing the head of the household with stable employment and seniority-based high 
wages. The provision of long-term employment and seniority earnings, which are important 
components of the Japanese management system, has functioned to secure the livelihood of 
employees and their families in Japan, where an adequate social security system has not been 
developed (Inagami and Whittaker, 2005; Nomura and Kimoto, 2002; Osawa, 2011). Such 
long-term employment until the mandatory retirement age enables stable family formation, 
and wage increases based on their seniority can cover a family’s increasing cost of living as 
children grow older (Ono, 1987).
Such generous rewards are not provided to all employees, but only to the “core” 
employees of the firm who are assumed to be qualified for them. The distinction between regular 
employees who work full-time with an indefinite-term contract and non-regular employees who 
work part-time or with a fixed-term contract has been used to determine who is entitled to the 
“family-supportive rewards” provided by Japanese firms. As this distinction was formed based 
on the male breadwinner model during the period of high economic growth that lasted until the 
1980s, non-regular workers are mainly female, particularly those who are married, though the 
number of male non-regular workers has been increasing since the 1990s. Combined with the 
practice of livelihood security provided by Japanese firms, the model has generated the notion 
that females can be financially supported by their spouses who work as regular employees 
and only need part-time or fixed-term jobs that are compatible with performing household 
chores. As married female workers do not have a responsibility to financially support their 
families, it is considered sufficient for non-regular workers to earn only supplementary income 
for their households (Osawa, 2011). This is the critical reasoning that legitimizes the large 
wage gap between regular and non-regular employees in Japan.3
3. The family-supportive rewards are paid to employees not based on the actual necessity to support 
their families, but on the type-of-employment categories, which match the actual necessity only when 
the head of a household is a father who works full-time with an indefinite-term contract. Although such 
discriminatory treatment of workers might be unfair, particularly for women who actually support their 
families, it could be accepted to the degree that females follow a “standard” life course, which assumes 
6
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However, regular employment is not more advantageous than non-regular employment 
in all respects. Reflecting the above logic, the distinction sometimes involves the difference 
in duties and responsibilities in the workplace. In Japan, it is difficult for employees to decline 
an order to perform overtime work, which leads to long working hours. However, it is regular 
employees who are expected to obey the order, while non-regular employees are basically 
exempted from it (Hisamoto, 2010). This is also the case with orders for relocation and job 
rotation, which are common practice in the Japanese personnel management system. The 
difference in the expected duties and responsibilities tied to the distinction between regular and 
non-regular employment is the flipside of the difference in entitlement to the family-supportive 
rewards based on the male breadwinner model. 
Moreover, the distinction also implies another assumed difference, the difference in 
the extent of a worker’s skills and abilities. In Japanese firms, which are eager to develop 
employees’ firm-specific skills through on-the-job training, it is assumed that regular employees 
tend to have higher skills because of the provision of abundant training opportunities for only 
regular employees, part of which is carried out through job rotation and relocation (Aoki, 1988; 
Koike, 1988; Sano, 2012). Furthermore, regular employees are assumed to have higher 
abilities than non-regular employees, because the former have been recruited through a more 
competitive selection process. These assumed differences, in addition to the difference in 
duties and responsibilities, may also contribute to the legitimation of the inequality in rewards 
between regular and non-regular workers.
In summary, the assumed differences in employees’ duties, as well as their opportunities 
for skill development and abilities, are attached to the distinction between regular and non-
regular employment, which technically implies only a difference in the type of employment 
in terms of working hours or labor contract, under the Japanese employment system. These 
assumed differences may contribute to the generation and reproduction of a large income 
gap between regular and non-regular workers by legitimating it independently of the gender 
difference and other job-related or personal differences in Japan. Although the distinction might 
be meaningful within a firm,4 it widely prevails in Japanese society as “shared understandings” 
(Dunlop, 1958, p. 16) on the categorization of workers. Thus, we attempt to explore whether 
these assumed differences prevailing in Japanese society may legitimize the large income 
gap between regular and non-regular employment in comparison with other countries.
2.2. Legitimation of rewards inequality in different 
institutional settings
The characteristics of the Japanese employment system can be clearly seen by comparing 
it with South Korea and the United States. These three countries have different institutional 
settings that may affect the extent and the legitimation of the income gap between regular and 
non-regular employment. Considering the case of Japan in the previous section, we rate the 
three countries according to the extent of the male breadwinner model and livelihood security 
provided by firms (Figure 1).
early marriage and no divorce.
4. Takahashi revealed that the wage gap between regular and non-regular employment occurs within a 
firm rather than between firms in Japan (Takahashi, 2016).
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Figure 1. Positions of the three countries in institutional settings
South Korea also has a strong male breadwinner model, while the livelihood security 
system provided by Korean firms is not as strong as the one in Japan (Jung and Cheon, 
2004). Therefore, the difference between regular and non-regular employment may not imply 
a difference in entitlement to family-supportive rewards, which corresponds to the difference 
between male breadwinners who work full-time and female supplementary earners who work 
part-time or with a fixed-term contract in Korea. Although the increase in non-regular workers 
and their comparatively low rewards is becoming a serious problem in Korean society (Shin, 
2012), there seems to be a critical difference between South Korea and Japan regarding how 
this disparity occurs and how it is legitimized due to a difference in institutional settings, as 
argued above.
In the United States, both the male breadwinner model and the livelihood security provided 
by firms are relatively weaker than in Japan. The United States has been characterized as a 
liberal market economy, in which the market mechanism plays a critical role in gaining access 
to resources that people need in order to make a living (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Estevez-Abe 
et al., 2001). The labor market in this country has been crucially driven by the mechanism of 
supply and demand. Workers who have skills in high demand in the labor market tend to have 
access to well-paying jobs, regardless of gender and race. In addition, the greater labor market 
flexibility in the U.S. does not require organizations to hire as many non-regular workers as 
in countries with rigid labor market structures with higher employment protection for regular 
workers, which is the case in Japan. Given the situation in the U.S., there is a possibility that 
the gap between regular and non-regular employment is smaller than other countries both in 
terms of the real income and just income. Therefore, it is useful to compare the three countries 
in order to consider how people’s ideas about income inequality depend on the institutional 
contexts of employment and welfare.
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3. Just income analysis based on factorial vignette 
survey data 
We utilize factorial vignette survey data on just income to explore whether and how much 
people accept the income gap in the three countries. A factorial vignette survey is a method that 
presents sets (=vignettes) of a fictitious but concrete situation that consists of various factors 
and asks respondents to evaluate each vignette (Atzmüller and Steiner, 2010; Wallander, 
2009). In each vignette, the levels of the factors can be randomly chosen to construct the 
vignette. Thus, we can construct vignettes so that factors have no correlation to each other, 
which enables us to examine the unique effects of factors independently of the others. Thanks 
to this advantage, it is possible to disentangle the effect of the distinction between regular 
and non-regular employment on just income from the effects of gender by utilizing factorial 
vignette survey data, although both are complexly intertwined in the real world.5 
So far, dozens of studies on just income have been conducted by analyzing data from 
factorial vignette surveys that ask for respondents’ evaluations of the level of income that is 
appropriate for fictitious workers with various attributes. They have revealed that levels of 
just income differ according to their occupations (Kelley and Evans, 1993; Kelley and Evans, 
2009; Osberg and Smeeding, 2006). They have also demonstrated that the just income of 
females is lower than that of males, controlling for other factors, and even female respondents 
report that the just income for females should be lower than that of males (Auspurg et al., 
2017; Jasso, 1994). We can interpret the results as indicating that respondents accept these 
income differences as a fair gap.
However, there have been few studies on the just income gap according to job-related 
factors other than occupation, such as the distinction between regular and non-regular workers. 
Moreover, no studies conduct an international comparison of just income and legitimation 
of income inequality focusing on Asian societies with different employment systems from 
Western societies. As a result, little is known about whether and how different employment 
systems between countries legitimize the income gap between workers.
Thus, our research project consisted of a factorial vignette survey on just income 
focusing on the gap between regular and non-regular employment, as well as the gender 
and other attributes of workers, conducted in Japan, South Korea, and the United States. 
Our survey also includes questions on respondents’ assumptions regarding the differences in 
duties, opportunities for skill development, and abilities between two types of workers (e.g., 
regular and non-regular workers) to examine whether these assumptions contribute to the 
legitimation of income gaps among workers. By utilizing the vignette survey data, we examine 
the following research questions in this paper.
1. How do the levels of just income for various workers differ according to the type of 
employment, gender, and other attributes of workers in Japan, South Korea, and the 
United States?
2. Do disadvantaged earners oppose earnings inequality based on these attributes, or do 
5. A vignette survey also has the advantage that responses are easy and they have less desirability bias 
because the target of evaluation is not conceptual but concrete.
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they accept it in these countries?
3. To what extent can the acceptance of earnings inequality be explained by respondents’ 
assumptions about duties, opportunities, and abilities?
4. Data and methods
4.1. Data
The data for this study was obtained from the “2018 SARI survey”6 that we conducted 
in August 2018. This was a web survey, whose samples were survey-takers registered with a 
research company. We limited our samples to those who are currently employed and are aged 
30 to 59.7 The sample size was 2,487 in Japan, 2,031 in Korea, and 1,879 in the U.S.
The main part of this survey consists of questions asking for respondents’ evaluations 
of the just income of various fictitious workers. The following six attributes describe the 
vignettes of workers:8 age (28 years old/43 years old), gender (male/female), education (high 
school/vocational school or vocational junior college or community college/university), type of 
employment (regular employee without fixed-term contract/contract employee), occupation 
(programmer/stock person), and family (single with no children/married with two children). The 
total vignette universe numbers 96 (=2*2*3*2*2*2) and they are divided into six subsets with 
16 vignettes, each of which is randomly assigned to respondents.9
1) Mr. Smith works at a company with 1,000 employees. He is a full-time (No 
Fixed-term Contract) employee who is a programmer at this company. Mr. Smith 
is an unmarried, high school graduate who is 43 years old. How much should Mr. 
Smith be paid for his job? Please include taxes in your answer.
Annual Salary (Including Tax) ________ Thousand Dollars Should Be Paid
Figure 2. Example of a question on just income
Figure 2 is an example of a vignette. As shown in the figure, a brief vignette text describing 
a fictitious worker is presented to a respondent. Below the text, a table for a summary of the 
worker’s attributes is also shown. Then respondents are asked how much they think this 
worker should be paid.10 
6..SARI is an abbreviation of “Sociological Analysis of Reward Inequality.”
7. We rely on quota sampling based on age groups, gender, and education. For education, only total 
proportions are represented by our samples.
8. Firm size is fixed to 1,000 employees to reduce the number of factors.
9. They are divided into subsets so that they have the highest D-efficiency based on Dülmer (2007). The 
order of presenting the 16 vignettes in each subset to respondents is also randomized.
10. This means that we use a direct measurement for just income (Markovsky and Eriksson, 2012).
Employment Type Position Education Family Age Gender
Mr. Smith
Full-Time (No
Fixed-term
Contract) Programmer
High
School Unmarried 43 Male
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This survey also asks respondents’ assumptions about the differences in levels of 
“obligations for doing sudden overtime and/or work over the holidays,” “opportunities for job 
experience and training,” and “ability to learn a new job and to perform it well” between workers 
with different attributes (e.g., full-time workers without a fixed-term contract and contract 
employees). It also includes questions about respondents’ attributes and job conditions, 
including the type of employment. 
4.2. Methods 
We conduct multilevel analyses to examine how the level of just income differs according 
to vignette attributes, respondent’s attributes, and the interaction of both. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the just income of various vignettes answered by respondents. 
The independent variables in level 1 (vignette level) are dummy variables for six factors that 
construct vignettes: age, gender, education, type of employment, occupation, and family of 
fictitious workers. The independent variables in level 2 (respondent level) are personal and 
job-related variables of respondents coded to harmonize with corresponding vignette attribute 
variables: age (less than or equal to 35/over 35), gender, education, type of employment 
(regular/non-regular employment), occupation (manual/non-manual), and family (having a 
child(ren)/having no children). Respondent’s individual annual income (logged) is also included 
as an independent variable in level 2.
Based on the results of the model without interaction terms, we first test the main effect 
of vignette attributes to answer research question 1. A significant main effect of a vignette 
attribute implies that respondents think there should be an income gap according to the factor. 
For example, if the dummy variable of non-regular workers has a significant negative effect, 
it means respondents think that the just income of non-regular workers is lower than that of 
regular workers.
Next, we add the interaction terms between a vignette attribute and a corresponding 
respondent’s attribute to the model to answer research question 2. For example, we add the 
interaction term between a female vignette and a female respondent, between a contract-
worker vignette and a respondent in non-regular employment, and so on. If the interaction 
term has a significant effect, a disadvantageous respondent and an advantageous respondent 
think differently about the level of just income gap between a vignette with the same attribute 
as themselves and a vignette without it.
We also add variables on respondents’ assumptions about the difference in levels of 
duties, opportunities for skill development, and abilities according to the vignette attribute and 
observe the changes in main and interaction effects of the factor to answer research question 
3. If main and interaction effects decrease by adding the variable regarding the assumption, 
we can conclude that the assumed difference according to the factor explains the gap in just 
income. In other words, it contributes to the legitimation of income inequality. 
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5. Results
5.1. Main effects of vignette attributes
Table 1 shows the results of the multilevel analysis of the just income of fictitious workers. 
Model 1 is the model that only has the main effects of the vignette and respondent’s attributes. 
Among the effects of vignette attributes, we find that all of the “28-year-old,” “stock person,” 
“high school graduate,” and “vocational school graduate” variables have significant negative 
effects in Japan, Korea, and the U.S., which implies that the effects of age, occupation, and 
education are similar among the three countries. People commonly think that the income of 
28-year-old workers should be lower than that of 43-year-old workers, the income of stock 
persons should be lower than that of programmers, and the income of high school graduates 
and that of vocational school graduates should be lower than that of college graduates in all 
countries. We can conclude that the effects of human capital-related attributes, such as age, 
occupation, and education, on just income are consistent among the three countries.11
Furthermore, being childless has negative effects in all three countries. People think that 
workers who do not have a child should be paid less than workers who have two children. This 
suggests that the concept of need-based income is accepted in all three countries, although 
the effect size is small.
In contrast, the effects of gender and type of employment are different between the U.S. 
and the other two countries. While there are no significant effects related to the “female” and 
“contract worker” variables in the U.S., these variables have significant negative effects on 
just income in Japan and South Korea. This means that people think the just income of female 
workers is lower than that of male workers, and the just income of contract workers is lower 
than that of regular workers in Japan and South Korea, although this is not the case in the 
United States. From these results, it can be observed that income gaps between these groups 
are accepted as just in Japan and South Korea but not in the U.S. Especially in Japan, the 
effects of type of employment are the third largest among the factors: just income for contract 
workers is lower than that for regular workers by six percent. Although it is smaller than the 
actual income gap, it is larger than in the other countries.
11. On the other hand, the magnitude of the effects differs to some extent among the countries. For 
example, the just income gap between a stock person and a programmer is quite large in the U.S. 
compared to Japan and Korea.
12
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Table 1. Multi-level analysis of just income (logged) of fictitious workers
Vignette attributes ｂ S.E. ｂ S.E. ｂ S.E. ｂ S.E. ｂ S.E. ｂ S.E.
 Female (vs. Male) -0.045 *** 0.002 -0.037 *** 0.002 -0.049 *** 0.002 -0.048 *** 0.002 -0.003 0.003 -0.004 0.005
 Contract worker (vs. Regular worker) -0.062 *** 0.002 -0.060 *** 0.002 -0.041 *** 0.002 -0.042 *** 0.002 -0.005 0.003 -0.006 0.004
 No children (vs. Married with 2 children) -0.032 *** 0.002 -0.037 *** 0.003 -0.031 *** 0.002 -0.033 *** 0.002 -0.010 ** 0.003 -0.010 * 0.004
 Stock person (vs. Programmer) -0.170 *** 0.002 -0.171 *** 0.002 -0.089 *** 0.002 -0.094 *** 0.002 -0.389 *** 0.003 -0.421 *** 0.004
 28 years old (vs. 43 yrs old) -0.100 *** 0.002 -0.103 *** 0.002 -0.134 *** 0.002 -0.142 *** 0.002 -0.023 *** 0.003 -0.023 *** 0.004
 Education(ref: College)
  High school -0.052 *** 0.002 -0.052 *** 0.003 -0.046 *** 0.002 -0.054 *** 0.003 -0.061 *** 0.004 -0.087 *** 0.007
  Vocational school -0.041 *** 0.002 -0.041 *** 0.003 -0.023 *** 0.002 -0.029 *** 0.003 -0.025 *** 0.004 -0.038 *** 0.007
Respondent's attributes
 Female -0.011 0.011 -0.001 0.012 -0.001 0.011 0.000 0.011 -0.004 0.020 -0.006 0.020
 Non-regular worker 0.040 ** 0.015 0.044 ** 0.015 0.049 ** 0.017 0.044 * 0.017 0.089 ** 0.028 0.087 ** 0.029
 Having no children 0.003 0.010 -0.001 0.010 -0.016 0.011 -0.020 † 0.011 -0.008 0.019 -0.009 0.020
 Manual worker 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.012 -0.003 0.013 -0.013 0.013 0.000 0.021 -0.042 † 0.021
 Youth (-35) -0.021 0.015 -0.031 * 0.015 0.024 † 0.014 0.002 0.014 0.005 0.023 0.004 0.023
 Education(ref: University)
  High school 0.001 0.012 -0.001 0.012 0.002 0.012 -0.010 0.013 0.012 0.022 -0.009 0.022
  Vocational school/Community college 0.000 0.013 0.004 0.013 -0.030 † 0.018 -0.035 † 0.018 0.029 0.035 0.013 0.036
 Individual income 0.172 *** 0.011 0.172 *** 0.011 0.128 *** 0.011 0.128 *** 0.011 0.191 *** 0.013 0.191 *** 0.013
Interaction between vignette attributes(v) and respondent's attributes(r)
 Female(v)*Female(r) -0.020 *** 0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.007
 Contract(v)*Non-regular(r) -0.009 * 0.004 0.009 † 0.005 0.004 0.009
 No children(v)*No children(r) 0.008 * 0.004 0.007 * 0.004 0.002 0.007
 Stock person(v)*Manual(r) 0.002 0.004 0.020 *** 0.004 0.085 *** 0.007
 28 years old(v)*Youth(r) 0.020 *** 0.005 0.043 *** 0.004 0.002 0.008
 High school(v)*High school(r) 0.006 0.005 0.019 *** 0.005 0.044 *** 0.009
 High school(v)*Vocational/JC(r) -0.006 0.006 0.010 0.007 0.025 0.015
 Vocational(v)*High school(r) 0.003 0.005 0.015 ** 0.005 0.020 * 0.009
 Vocational(v)*Vocational/JC(r) -0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.024 0.015
Constant 5.116 *** 0.072 5.115 *** 0.072 7.234 *** 0.090 7.246 *** 0.091 3.138 *** 0.061 3.169 *** 0.061
-2LL -18098 -18158 -22731 -22881 14668 14486
N(obs) 39760 39760 32192 32192 28816 28816
N(groups) 2485 2485 2012 2012 1801 1801
***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 †p<.1
Japan South Korea The United States
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
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5.2. Interaction effects between the vignette and 
respondent’s attributes
Model 2 of table 1 is the model that includes interaction terms between the vignette 
and respondent’s attributes of the same facet, such as one between the female vignette and 
female respondent, in addition to their main effects. We coded dummy variables of the vignette 
and respondent’s attributes so that a disadvantageous position in the income structure of 
these societies, like that of non-regular workers, takes the value of one. Therefore, a positive 
effect of the interaction term means that respondents in a disadvantageous position think 
that a smaller income gap between the advantageous and disadvantageous groups is just 
than respondents in an advantageous position do. According to the social identity theory, 
people evaluate distributive justice in a way favorable to themselves (Shamon and Dülmer, 
2014). Thus, we can expect that the interaction terms between the vignette and respondent’s 
attribute have positive effects. In contrast, according to the reward expectation theory, we 
can also assume there is little difference in the just income gap between those who are in an 
advantageous position and those who are in a disadvantageous position.
Table 1 shows that almost all of the coefficients of interaction terms are positive 
in South Korea and the United States as we expect, even though some of them are not 
statistically significant. However, there are significant negative interaction effects between a 
female vignette and a female respondent and between a contract worker vignette and a non-
regular worker respondent in Japan. These negative effects mean that female respondents 
in Japan think that a larger income gap between male workers and female workers is just 
than male respondents do, and non-regular worker respondents think that a larger income 
gap between regular workers and contract workers is just than regular worker respondents 
do. In other words, female and non-regular respondents, who receive lower income than their 
counterparts on average, more strongly accept the income gap according to gender and type 
of employment, respectively, in Japan. 
How can we explain the over-acceptance of the income gap by females and non-regular 
workers against their own interests? In the following sections, we answer this question by 
exploring the assumed difference in duties, opportunities for skill development, and abilities 
between the two groups, focusing on the income gap between regular and non-regular workers 
and its acceptance.
5.3. Assumed differences between regular and non-regular 
workers
Figure 3 shows responses to the question “From the following two employee groups, 
which group, on average, do you think has greater obligations for doing sudden overtime 
and/or work over the holidays?” from regular and non-regular employees based on a seven-
point scale from “1: Full-time (no-fixed term contract) employee has a greater obligation” to 
“7: Contract employee has a greater obligation.” About 70% of Japanese respondents think 
that the former has a greater obligation to work overtime and on holidays, while only 4% 
assume that the latter has greater obligations. Compared to Korea (49% versus 22%) and 
the U.S. (34% versus 25%), we can see that there is a stronger assumption that regular 
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employees should accept overtime work instead of non-regular employees in Japan. Thus, the 
distinction between the two types of employees, which technically denotes only the difference 
in the period of the labor contract, is accompanied by an assumed difference in duties in the 
workplace in Japan.
The responses to the question asking about differences in duties between female and 
male employees (Figure 4) show a clear contrast between those of regular and non-regular 
employees. The assumption that males should accept overtime work instead of female 
employees is stronger in Korea (50% versus 9%) than in Japan (25% versus 10%) and the 
U.S. (13% versus 12%). While the responses in the U.S. are perfectly balanced to show gender 
equality in the workplace, the imbalance in Japanese responses is not strong compared to 
Korea or compared to the Japanese responses regarding the difference between regular and 
non-regular employees. Although the distinction between regular and non-regular employees 
is strongly connected to gender roles, as we previously argued, the assumed difference in 
duties in the workplace is more obvious between regular and non-regular employees than 
between male and female employees in current-day Japan. We can conclude that the assumed 
difference in duties in the workplace between males and females, which was originally based 
on the male breadwinner model, has already transferred to the distinction between regular 
and non-regular employment in Japan, while it remains within the gender relationship, leading 
to a smaller assumed difference between regular and non-regular employees in Korea. 
Figure 3. Assumptions about duties of regular and non-regular workers
Figure 4. Assumptions about duties of female and male workers
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Figure 5. Assumptions about opportunities of regular and non-regular workers
Figure 6. Assumptions about the abilities of regular and non-regular workers
Responses to the questions asking about differences in opportunities for job experience 
and training (Figure 5) and the ability to learn a new job and to perform it well (Figure 6) 
between regular and non-regular employees show a similar pattern. The assumption that 
regular employees have more opportunities or better abilities than non-regular employees 
is stronger in Japan and Korea compared to the United States. We can observe that the 
distinction is utilized as a hierarchical categorization of employees in the human resource 
management of Japanese and Korean firms. 
5.4. Changes in effects by adding variables on respondents’ 
assumptions
We will examine whether these assumptions explain the just income gap between regular 
workers and non-regular workers and its over-acceptance by non-regular worker respondents 
in Japan and South Korea. To this end, we add the interaction terms between the contract 
worker vignette and respondents’ assumptions about duties, opportunities, and abilities to 
the model and observe the changes in the effects of the contract worker vignette and the 
interaction term between the contract worker vignette and non-regular worker respondent.
Table 2 shows the results of Japanese respondents. Model 3 is the baseline model 
constructed by adding variables of a respondent’s assumptions about the duties, opportunities,
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 Table 2. Multilevel analysis of just income (logged) with respondents’ assumptions (Japan)
 
and abilities of regular and non-regular employees to model 2 in Table 1. The negative effect 
of the contract worker vignette (-0.060), which is the same as in model 2, means that regular 
worker respondents think the just income of a contract worker is lower than that of a regular 
worker (by -0.060 in terms of logged income). The negative effect of the interaction term 
between the contract worker vignette and a non-regular worker respondent (-0.009), which is 
also the same as in model 2, implies the over-acceptance of the income gap by non-regular 
worker respondents: they think that a larger income gap between regular workers and contract 
workers is just than regular worker respondents do (by -0.009 in terms of logged income). 
Models 4 to 6 are models that include each of the interaction terms between the contract 
worker vignette and a respondent’s assumptions about duties, opportunities, and abilities. All 
of the added interaction terms in these models have significant negative effects. This implies 
that those who assume regular employees have more duties, more opportunities, or better 
abilities think that there should be a larger income gap between regular and contract workers. 
In other words, the assumed differences in duties, opportunities, and abilities serve as reasons 
for the gap in just income between regular and non-regular employees.
How much do these assumed differences explain the gap in just income and its over-
acceptance? We can answer this question by observing changes in the coefficients from 
the baseline model. By adding the interaction terms, the main effect of the contract worker 
vignette, and the interaction effect between the contract vignette and non-regular worker 
respondent, which are of interest to us, diminished in most cases. For example, the main 
effect of the contract worker vignette decreases by 29%, from -0.060 in model 3 to -0.043 
in model 4. This means that 29% of the gap in just income between regular and non-regular 
employment (observed among regular worker respondents) is explained by the tendency of 
Vignette attributes ｂ ｂ ｂ ｂ ｂ ｂ
 Contract worker (vs. Regular worker) -0.060 *** -0.043 *** -0.045 *** -0.056 *** -0.040 *** -0.040 ***
          (others variables are also controlled)
Respondent's attributes
 More duties for regular workers -0.002 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002
 More opportunities for regular workers 0.002 0.002 0.009 † 0.002 0.006 0.009
 Better ability for regular workers -0.015 ** -0.015 ** -0.015 ** -0.011 * -0.014 ** -0.015 **
          (others variables are also controlled)
Interaction between vignette attributes(v) and respondent's attributes(r)
 Contract(v)*Non-regular(r) -0.009 * -0.007 † -0.007 -0.010 * -0.007 -0.006
 Contract(v)*More duties for regular(r) -0.012 *** -0.007 *** -0.008 ***
 Contract(v)*More opportunities for regular(r) -0.014 *** -0.009 *** -0.009 ***
 Contract(v)*Better ability for regular(r) -0.009 *** -0.001
          (others variables are also controlled)
-2LL -18168 -18257 -18263 -18195 -18285 -18285
AIC -18108 -18195 -18201 -18133 -18219 -18221
BIC -17851 -17929 -17934 -17867 -17936 -17946
N(obs) 39760 39760 39760 39760 39760 39760
N(groups) 2485 2485 2485 2485 2485 2485
***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 †p<.1
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
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the respondents who assume regular employees have more duties to think that a wider income 
gap is just between the two types of employment. Likewise, the decrease of 18% in the effects 
of the interaction term between the contract vignette and non-regular worker respondents 
from -0.009 in model 3 to -0.007 in model 4 means that the same tendency explains 18% of 
the over-acceptance of the income gap by non-regular worker respondents.
The above explanation also applies to model 5; 25% of the gap in just income and 
25% of the over-acceptance in model 3 is explained by the tendency of the respondents who 
assume regular employees have more opportunities to think that a wider income gap is just 
between regular and non-regular employees. However, this is not the case with model 6 with 
the interaction term on the assumption about abilities. The main effect of the contract worker 
vignette decreases only slightly, and the interaction between the contract worker vignette and 
non-regular worker respondents increases from model 3 to model 6 by adding the interaction 
term between the contract worker vignette and a respondent’s assumption about abilities. This 
means that the assumed difference in ability between regular and non-regular employees does 
not explain the gap in just income or its over-acceptance by non-regular worker respondents.
The above results are also confirmed by model 7, which includes all the interaction 
terms. In model 7, the interaction terms between the contract worker vignette and respondents’ 
assumptions about duties and opportunities are significant, while the one about abilities is 
not. We can conclude that assumed differences in duties and opportunities are particularly 
important for explaining the gap in just income between regular and non-regular workers in 
Japan. Through model 8, which has both interaction terms, we can see that 34% of the gap in 
just income and 28% of the over-acceptance of it are explained by the tendency of those who 
assume regular employees have more duties and opportunities to think that the gap in income 
between regular and non-regular employees should be wider.12
Table 3 demonstrates the results of the same models for Korean respondents. The 
negative effect of the contract worker vignette (-0.042) implies that regular worker respondents 
think that the just income of contract workers is lower than that of regular workers (by -0.042 
in terms of logged income). The positive effect of the interaction term between the contract 
worker vignette and non-regular worker respondents (0.007) means that non-regular worker 
respondents think that there should be a smaller income gap between regular workers and 
contract workers than regular worker respondents do (by 0.007 in terms of logged income), 
as we expected. 
The interaction terms between the contract worker vignette and a respondent’s 
assumptions about duties, opportunities, and abilities in models 4 to 6 have smaller effects 
than those in Japan, although they are statistically significant. Moreover, the main effect of the 
contract worker vignette does not change as much compared to its Japanese counterpart by 
adding these interaction variables. This implies that the tendency of those who assume that 
regular employees have more duties, more opportunities, and better abilities to think the gap 
in income should be wider does not explain the gap in just income between regular and non-
regular employees as much.13
12. The interaction term between the contract worker vignette and non-regular worker respondent is 
no longer significant in model 8. Model 8 is the best-fitted model with the smallest BIC for Japanese 
respondents.
13. Although the interaction term between the contract worker vignette and non-regular worker 
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Table 3. Multilevel analysis of just income (logged) with respondents’ assumptions (Korea)
Among the three interaction terms, we find the one with the assumed difference in abilities 
has the strongest effect, and model 6, with only one interaction term regarding ability, is the 
best-fitted model with the smallest BIC for Korean respondents. Based on the estimation, 
about 9% of the gap in just income between regular and non-regular employment (observed 
among regular worker respondents) is explained by the tendency of the respondents who 
assume regular employees have better abilities to think that the wider income gap between 
the two types of employment is just.
6. Conclusion and discussion
This paper explored the extent of the gap in just income between regular and non-regular 
workers, as well as the gap according to other attributes of workers, and examined whether 
even the disadvantaged, such as non-regular worker respondents, accept the pay gap and 
what explains the extent of its acceptance.
Based on the multilevel analysis of the cross-national factorial vignette data from a 
survey we conducted in Japan, South Korea, and the United States, we find that respondents 
think that income gaps according to human capital-related attributes, such as age, occupation, 
and education, are fair in all three countries. On the other hand, only Japanese and Korean 
respondents think there should be a significant income gap between regular and non-regular 
workers, as well as between male and female workers. We can conclude that the income gaps 
respondent decreases by adding the interaction terms, it seems to occur in estimation as compensation 
for the slight decrease in the main effect of the contract worker vignette in that the sum of the coefficients 
of these variables, main effect, and the interaction effect, is consistent across models.
Vignette attributes ｂ ｂ ｂ ｂ ｂ ｂ
 Contract worker (vs. Regular worker) -0.042 *** -0.040 *** -0.038 *** -0.039 *** -0.037 *** -0.038 ***
          (others variables are also controlled)
Respondent's attributes
 More duties for regular workers -0.007 * -0.005 -0.007 * -0.007 * -0.005 -0.005
 More opportunities for regular workers 0.011 ** 0.011 ** 0.014 ** 0.011 ** 0.012 ** 0.011 **
 Better ability for regular workers -0.009 † -0.009 † -0.009 † -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
          (others variables are also controlled)
Interaction between vignette attributes(v) and respondent's attributes(r)
 Contract(v)*Non-regular(r) 0.009 † 0.008 0.009 † 0.007 0.007 0.007
 Contract(v)*More duties for regular(r) -0.004 *** -0.003 * -0.003 **
 Contract(v)*More opportunities for regular(r) -0.004 ** -0.001
 Contract(v)*Better ability for regular(r) -0.007 *** -0.006 ** -0.006 ***
          (others variables are also controlled)
-2LL -22893 -22909 -22902 -22916 -22924 -22923
AIC -22833 -22847 -22840 -22854 -22858 -22859
BIC -22581 -22587 -22580 -22594 -22582 -22591
N(obs) 32192 32192 32192 32192 32192 32192
N(groups) 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012
***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 †p<.1
Model 8Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
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between these groups are accepted as just in Japan and South Korea, while this is not the 
case in the United States.
However, there is a large difference in who accepts the income gap according to the 
type of employment and gender between Japan and South Korea. In Japan, respondents 
in a disadvantaged position, such as non-regular workers and female respondents, think 
that the income gap according to the type of employment and gender should be wider than 
their counterparts do, against their own interests. In Korea, we cannot find such a tendency: 
non-regular worker respondents accept a smaller income gap as just than regular worker 
respondents, for example.
Some extent of the acceptance of income inequality between regular and non-regular 
workers and its over-acceptance by the latter in Japan is explained by the assumed differences 
in duties and opportunities at the workplace between the two groups. In Japan, the difference 
in duties in the workplace, such as the obligation to perform overtime work, is attached to the 
distinction between regular and non-regular employment, which is technically distinguished 
only by the difference in working hours or the period of the labor contract, and it legitimates 
the income gap between them based on the logic of compensating wage differentials theory 
(Rosen, 1986). Regular workers are regarded as earning more income in exchange for 
accepting larger duties than non-regular workers in Japan. This explanation also applies to 
the assumed difference in opportunities between regular and non-regular workers.
We argue that the Japanese employment system has contributed to the attachment of 
different duties and opportunities to the distinction between regular and non-regular employees. 
The combination of the male breadwinner model and Japanese firms’ practice of securing the 
livelihood of employees and their families has made the distinction between regular and non-
regular employees imply a difference in entitlement to family-supportive rewards provided 
by firms. As a result, regular employment, which is mainly occupied by males, is assumed to 
entail more duties, as well as more opportunities, and vice versa. The assumed difference in 
duties and opportunities between regular and non-regular employees is based on separate 
gender roles, but it has been transferred to the distinction between regular and nonregular 
employment and does not persist as much as a gender difference in Japan as in South Korea.14
In South Korea, the distinction between regular and non-regular employment does not 
accompany differences in entitlement to family-supportive wages or duties in the workplace as 
much, because Korean firms do not have as strong a practice of ensuring the financial security 
of employees and their families as Japanese firms do. Therefore, the gap in just income 
between regular and non-regular employment is not explained by the assumed difference in 
duties. Although Korean respondents assume there is a difference in opportunities for skill 
development between the two groups, it does not contribute to the explanation of the gap in 
just income as much. The assumption that regular and non-regular workers have different 
14. This may suggest the strong autonomy of status system of workers in Japan. Although investigating 
why this is so remains a future task, one of the reasons may be the fact that simple and broad job 
classifications and flexible job assignments are common in Japanese firms (Aoki, 1988). There is 
a possibility that the distinction between regular and non-regular employees to which the assumed 
difference in duties, opportunities, and abilities is attached have been developed as a human resource 
management device in Japan, where the job differentiation based on occupation is generally weak. 
Another possible reason may be the prohibition of gender discrimination by the government, such as 
the enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law.
20
FFJ D
ISC
U
SSIO
N
 PA
PER
 #19-02
levels of abilities has the strongest power in explaining the gap in just income among the three 
assumptions, but most of the differences in just income remain unexplained. 
In the U.S., due to the weak male breadwinner model and little livelihood security provided 
by firms, in addition to the large labor market flexibility, the distinction between regular and 
non-regular employment is not significant in the labor market nor associated with different 
duties or abilities. Therefore, the income gap between them is not legitimated; consequently, 
there is no just income gap between them.
Income inequalities tend to remain unresolved when they have the logic of legitimation 
(Costa-Lopes et al., 2013). Based on the analysis in this paper, the income inequality between 
regular and non-regular employment in Japan has a stronger logic of legitimation under 
the Japanese employment system and, therefore, is more likely to persist than its Korean 
counterpart. It is necessary to change the assumptions that legitimate the gaps, by utilizing 
the framing perspectives, if useful, to reduce the large income inequality between regular and 
non-regular workers in Japan.
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